Prohibition of Discrimination (Article 15) under Constitution of India

In this article we made a detailed study on Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, it provides for the Prohibition of Discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

 

1. Introduction:

 

Discrimination has been a deeply rooted social issue that has plagued societies throughout history. To counteract this injustice and ensure equality among all citizens, the framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated a series of safeguards, including Article 15, which prohibits discrimination on various grounds. Article 15 stands as a testament to India's commitment to fostering a society that values diversity, inclusivity, and social justice.

 

2. Discrimination means:

 

Treating a person or particular group of people differently, especially in a worse way from the way in which you treat other people, because of their race, gender, sexuality, etc

 

3. Article 15:

 

Article 15 contains provisions for a particular application of the general principle of equality of treatment embodied in Article 14. It prohibits discrimination against citizens on the ground ONLY of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. It may be noted that Article 15 secures the right against discrimination, only to citizens and that non-citizens cannot invoke the provisions of the Article. General manager Vs. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36.

 

3.1. No Discrimination Against Citizens [Article 15(1)]

 

Clause (1), of Article 15 provides:

 

“The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.”

 

The words “discriminate against” means “to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others”. It involves an element of unfavourable bias and it is in this sense that the expression has to be understood in the context of Article 15(1) Kathi Raning Rawat Vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.

 

On the Ground "ONLY" of

 

In Article 15(1), the emphasis seems to be on the word “only” running with the prohibited grounds. It indicates that it is only where the discrimination rests solely on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, that Article 15 comes into play. State of Rajasthan Vs. Thakur Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208. The significance of the word "only" in Article 15 is that other qualifications being equal, “religion”, “race”, “caste”, “sex”, or “place of birth”, should not be a ground of preference or disability.

 

In D.P. Joshi Vs. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1955 SC 334, popularly known as first capitation fee case, a rule framed for the admission to State Medical Colleges, required the payment of capitation fee from non-Madhya Bharat students. The Madhya Bharat students were exempted from the payment. The rule which discriminated on the ground of residence was upheld by the Supreme Court, as not violative of Article 15(1). “Place of birth”, the Cour held, was different from “residence”.

 

3.2. No Discrimination as to Use or Access to Public Places [Article 15(2)]

 

Clause (2) of Article 15 provides,

 

“No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to -

(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments; or

(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public”.

 

Clause (2) of Article 15 is a particular application of the general principle against discrimination embodied in Clause (1). While Cause (1) forbids discrimination against citizens in all matters. Clause (2) deals only with case of discrimination as regards to the use or access to public places mentioned therein.

 

3.3. Special Provision for Women and Children [Article 15(3)]

 

Clause (3) of Article 15 provides:

 

“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children”.

 

The word “for” in Clause (3) signifies that special provisions can be made "in favour of women and not against them. Therefore, Clause (1) to (3) of Article 15, read together would imply that State can discriminate in favour of women against men, but cannot discriminate in favour of men against women. V. Revathi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 835.

 

Article 42 of the Constitution enjoins the State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. A law made to implement this Directive Principle of State Policy, securing maternity relief to women workers, would not be violative of Article 15(1), but would be within the purview of Clause (3) of this Article. Section 125 of the Criminal procedure Code, 1974 (Section 488 of the old code), which requires the husband to maintain his wife and not vice versa, has been held not discriminatory, for it merely provides benefits and protection to women and children in certain circumstances. Shahdad Vs. Mohd. Abdualla, AIR 1967 J & K 120. Order 5, Rule 15 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which makes service of summon on the male members of the family has been held not discriminatory and it is a special provision covered by Article 15(3). Likewise, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, absolutely vesting the inherited property in women which was earlier held by them as limited estates, has been held to be protected from attack under Article (15)(3). Thota Sesharathamma Vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312.

 

The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 and the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 added Articles 243-D and 243-T to the Constitution, making provisions for reservation of not less than one third of the total seats for women in the constitution of the Panchayats and the Municipalities respectively. The proposed Constitution (84th Amendment) Bill 1998 contains provisions for the reservation of 33 per cent of seats for women in the composition of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies of the States. The object of these provisions is to raise the political status of our women folk and the removal of imbalances in the participation of men and women in political life. These provisions would be protected under Article 15(3).

 

Thereafter, in Government of A.P. Vs. P.B. Vijaykumar AIR 1985 SC 1648, the Supreme Court, explaining the object for inserting Clause (3) to Article 15, observed:

 

The insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped. As a result, they are unable to participate in the socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of equality It is in order to eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Article 15(3) is placed in Article 15. Its object is to strengthen and improve the status of women.

 

Special provision referred to in Clause (3) of Article 15 need not be restricted to measures which are beneficial in the strict sense The provision, making women ineligible for the post of a warden in men's jail would be covered by Article 19(3), and would be valid, as the position of a woman would become awkward and hazardous while dealing with habitual offenders. Raghubans Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 P & H 7.

 

The “special provision” which the Slate may make under Article 15(3), can be in the form of either affirmative action or reservation.

 

Therefore, making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3) and the power conferred under this Clause is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. Since Article 16 does not specifically permit special provisions for women being made by the State, it has been held that Article 16 could not, in any manner, derogate from the power conferred upon the State in this connection under Article (15) (3). This power has been held to be wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State.

 

In Yusuf Abdul Aziz Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 321, the Bombay High Court upheld validity of Section 497 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, and said that the impugned section was justified on the ground that the discrimination was not based on the ground of sex alone, but for other reasons also The Court explained that women in this country were married at a very young age and that their husband could have a plurality of wives. The Legislature, therefore, took a lenient and charitable view of the weakness of the women in that particular situation. The Court thus held that discrimination under Section 497. I.P.C. was not based on sex alone. The Supreme Court, on appeal, laid down that it was covered by the exception clause (3) of Article 15.

 

3.4. Special Provision for Backward Classes [Article 15(4)]

 

Clause (4) of Article 15 contains another exception to Clause (1) and (2). It provides:

 

“Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes”.

 

This Clause was added by the Constitution (First Amendment Act, 1951, as a consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras Vs. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226.

 

In this case, the Madras Government issued a communal CO., providing for reservation of seats in the State Medical and Engineering Colleges for different communities in proportion of students of each community. Thus, the seats were reserved on the ground of religion, race and caste. The Order was challenged as violative of Article 15 (1) since it discriminated on the ground of religion, race and caste. The Government contended that the Order was issued in order to promote the Directive Principle of State Policy enshrined in Article 46 which enjoined the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Supreme Court, however, held the Order void as violative of Article 15(1) The Court explained that while fundamental rights were justiciable, the Directive Principles had been expressly declared non-justiciable and that it was their duty to enforce only the justiciable provisions.

 

The Court thus gave a literal interpretation to the constitutional provisions which led to the insertion of Clause (4) in Article 15, enabling the State to make special provision for the advancement of advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes

 

Clause (4) of Article 15 is an enabling provision. It merely confers discretion on the State to make special provisions. It does not impose any obligation on the State to take any action under it. State of M.P. Vs. Mohan Singh, AIR 1996 SC 2106.

 

Scope of Clause (4) of Article 15

 

Clause (4) of Article 15 enables the State to make special provisions. “Special Provision for advancement” is a wide expression and should not be construed in a restricted sense as meaning only social and educational advancement. The expression may include many more things besides mere reservation of seats in colleges It may be by way of financial assistance, free medical educational and hostel facilities, scholarships, free transport, concessional or free housing, exemption from requirements insisted upon in the case of other classes.

 

Such “special provisions” as are permissible under Clause (4) of Article 15 must, however, be for the advancement of persons belonging to those categories and therefore, special provision which is not t for the advancement of those persons would not be protected under Article 15(4). Peculiar principles evolved for implementing constitutional reservations under Article 15(4) and 16(4) cannot be applied to all reservations unmindful of the purpose of reservation.

 

4. Conclusion:

 

Article 15 stands as a beacon of hope and progress in India's journey towards equality and social justice. It affirms the nation's commitment to ensuring that every citizen is treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their background. As society evolves and new challenges arise, the principles enshrined in Article 15 continue to guide the nation towards a more inclusive and equitable future.

 

5. Suggestion:

 

To strengthen the impact of Article 15, it may need to enhanced awareness and sensitization campaigns to install the values of equality and tolerance from an early age. Additionally, the efficient enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and the swift resolution of causes related to discrimination are essential to ensure that the spirit of Article 15 is upheld.